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The first chapter of the FSR analyses the macro-financial environment of the Spanish 
economy in the recent period and that of the countries with which it shares the 
closest trade and financial ties, highlighting the most significant risks. These risks 
remain partially linked to the course of the pandemic, despite the vaccine roll-out 
having reduced the likelihood of the most adverse medium-term scenarios. However, 
the continuation of the pandemic into the quarters immediately following this 
publication increases the probability of more persistent effects on the financial 
capacity of households and firms, and on the productive system itself. Against this 
backdrop, an adequate economic policy response stands as the main mitigating 
factor. In the financial markets, prices of risk-bearing assets have risen in recent 
months, buoyed by an improving macroeconomic outlook following the emergence 
of effective vaccines against the coronavirus. However, high valuations for certain 
assets have generated some concern regarding the sustainability of these prices, 
particularly if less favourable macro-financial scenarios were to materialise. In the 
residential property market, sales have declined markedly relative to 2019, while 
prices have continued to show a degree of downward rigidity. Lastly, vulnerability 
has increased markedly due to the crisis weakening the financial position of the 
various non-financial sectors, particularly general government, while the deterioration 
in the private sector (households and firms) has focused on certain specific segments.
1.1 Macroeconomic environment
1.1.1  Systemic and materially important countries for the Spanish economy 
and banking system
Global	economic	activity	recovered	in	2020	H2,	but	was	adversely	affected	by	
the	worsening	 of	 the	 pandemic	 from	 late	 2020	 onwards.	Having slumped in 
2020 H1, global activity surged in Q3 thanks to the easing of the containment 
measures and the support provided by economic policies. However, the recovery 
lost steam from the end of the last year, in the face of the worsening of the pandemic 
and the reintroduction of restrictions. The effect of the pandemic has been uneven 
across regions, owing to differences in how it has unfolded, the containment 
measures implemented, the degree of exposure to the hardest-hit sectors and the 
economic policies introduced. In 2020, world GDP declined by 3.3%, with marked 
regional differences (see Charts 1.1.1 and 1.1.2). Among the advanced economies, 
euro area GDP shrank by 6.7%, with the services sector being particularly affected1 
1  See A. L. Gómez and A. Río, (2021) “The uneven impact of the health crisis on the economies of the euro area in 
2020”, Occasional Paper, Banco de España, forthcoming.
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(see Chart 1.1.3). Spanish GDP declined by a notable 10.8%, while GDP in Germany 
fell by 5.3%. The contraction stood at 3.5% in the United States, 4.9% in Japan and 
9.8% in the United Kingdom. Among the emerging economies, the most adverse 
effects were felt in Latin America, where GDP fell by 7% on average. By contrast, 
activity in China, the first economy to be affected by the pandemic, grew 2.3%. 
The impact of the pandemic has been uneven across regions, shaped by the course of the pandemic, exposure to the most affected sectors 
(mainly the services sector) and the support measures provided in economic policies. The development of effective vaccines has improved 
the outlook, although the spread of variants of the virus represents a downside risk. Emerging financial markets registered a recovery in 
recent months, which was likewise reflected in exchange rate movements, which moderated from February onwards.
THE BASELINE SCENARIO OF A GRADUAL RECOVERY IN GLOBAL ECONOMIC ACTIVITY IN 2021-2022 IS GROUNDED ON
EXPECTATIONS OF A DECLINING INCIDENCE OF COVID-19 AND THE ADEQUATE APPLICATION OF ECONOMIC POLICIES
Chart 1.1
SOURCES: Consensus Forecast, national statistics, Reuters and Eurostat.
a Vulnerable services include those most exposed to the containment measures (22.4% of total euro area GVA): wholesale and retail trade, 
transportation and hospitality (G-I) and artistic and entert. activities and other services (R-U).
b Other = primary (A); energy; non-market services (O-Q); other market services (communications; financial and insurance act., real estate act. and 
professional, scientific and auxiliary act.).
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The	economic	outlook	has	improved	thanks	to	the	availability	of	vaccines,	but	
some	 uncertainty	 persists	 as	 to	 the	 course	 of	 the	 health	 situation	 and	 the	
intensity	of	the	recovery. Following a weak start to 2021 due to the worsening of 
the pandemic, the recovery is expected to accelerate in H2 as those sectors that 
require greater social interaction are revived by progress in the vaccination 
programmes. Added to this would be the additional stimuli provided through 
economic policies, such as the extension of support measures for households and 
firms in most euro area countries and in the United States.2 In Europe, plans to 
bolster the economy using funds from the Next Generation EU (NGEU) programme, 
which have yet to be determined, will prove most effective if the funds are allocated 
to high value-added investments and are supplemented by reforms to strengthen 
potential growth. The analysts’ consensus expects the world economy to grow at a 
rate close to 6% in 2021 and above 4% in 2022 (see Chart 1.1.2). The consensus 
figures for the euro area, which are in line with those of the ECB’s March projection 
exercise, forecast GDP growth of around 4% in both years, meaning pre-pandemic 
activity levels would not be reached until 2022 H2.
In	the	near	term,	the	risks	for	the	world	economy	remain	associated	with	the	
pandemic	 and	 in	 particular	 with	 the	 headway	 made	 in	 the	 vaccination	
programme.	Looking	ahead,	 there	 is	still	 a	 risk	 that	solvency	problems	will	
emerge	 for	 non-financial	 corporations	 after	 the	 crisis.	 The downside risks 
revolve, first, around the spread of new and more resistant variants of the virus or a 
delay in the vaccination process, which may lead to fresh social distancing measures. 
Second, insufficient support from economic policies, or the premature withdrawal 
thereof, could result in solvency problems for businesses. Likewise, the potential 
spillover effects of an increase in long-term interest rates in the United States, 
against the backdrop of the impact had by fiscal expansion on activity and inflation 
in this country, could lead to a tightening of financial conditions in other economic 
areas that are in a different cyclical position. Lastly, high government and private 
indebtedness could curtail spending and hinder the recovery process. On the 
positive side, the outlook could be improved by more favourable progress in the 
vaccination programme. Meanwhile, the possibility of a no-deal Brexit, which was 
among the risks identified in the previous FSR, has faded thanks to the withdrawal 
agreement between the United Kingdom and the European Union.
The	 main	 emerging	 economies	 where	 Spanish	 banks	 have	 a	 significant	
presence3	likewise	recorded	a	recovery	in	2020	H2,	which	lost	momentum	in	
early	 2021.	Broadly speaking, emerging markets recovered much of the losses 
2  See Box 3 “Analysis	of	US	fiscal	policy	plans”, Quarterly Report on the Spanish Economy 2021 Q1.
3	 	Each	 year	 the	Banco	de	España	 identifies	 a	 list	 of	 non-EU/EEA	 countries	 (third	 countries)	 that	 are	materially	
significant	for	the	Spanish	banking	system,	based	on	the	volume	and	weight	of	the	Spanish	banking	system’s	
international exposures. This exercise is conducted pursuant to the recommendations of the European Systemic 
Risk	Board	(ESRB).	In	2020,	six	emerging	countries	were	identified	in	this	category:	Mexico,	Brazil,	Turkey,	Chile,	
Peru and Colombia.
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registered from March 2020. Capital inflows increased from November onwards and, in 
some segments and regions, offset the outflows recorded in the first months of 2020. 
However, several of these countries have recently seen long-term interest rates increase, 
as a result of rising long-term interest rates in advanced economies, and currency 
depreciation. Financial conditions and capital flows towards emerging economies may 
be adversely affected if these trends continue going forward. In this regard, the main 
emerging countries in terms of Spanish banking exposures find themselves affected both 
by pandemic-related risks and those relating to macro-financial imbalances:
— In Mexico, GDP fell by 8.5% in 2020, more than the Latin American average, 
partly owing to less fiscal stimulus,4 greater exposure to tourism and the 
sharp decline in the US manufacturing sector in the early stages of the 
pandemic.5 The Mexican economy is also exposed to a potential tightening 
of global financial conditions, along with local factors such as uncertainty 
stemming from proposed reforms to the energy sector6 and to the Banco 
de México Law.7 These could undermine investor confidence and the 
country’s credit rating, which remains adversely affected by the PEMEX 
situation. On the positive side, Mexico may be among the economies to 
benefit most from the fiscal stimulus in the United States via its trade and 
remittances channels.
— In Brazil, by contrast, GDP fell by a more moderate 4.1%, owing to less 
stringent restrictions on movement and sizeable monetary, and particularly 
fiscal, support. The outlook for 2021, however, is less auspicious, since much 
of the credit support programmes and fiscal stimuli, particularly transfers to 
households, have expired8 and a monetary tightening has begun, which is 
discounted to last until 2022. The weaker relative performance of the Brazilian 
real is also a reflection of the continuing political tensions over the reforms 
and fiscal adjustment needed to tackle the high level of government debt (see 
Chart 1.1.4). 
— Turkey was one of the few countries to record GDP growth in 2020 (1.8%), 
thanks in part to the support measures introduced, particularly for credit. 
4	 	See	the	IMF	policy	response	tracker:	Policy Responses to COVID-19. 
5  See Banco de España (2020), Report on the Latin American economy. First half of 2020, for a description of the 








8  The Brazilian government did not reintroduce transfers to households that expired at the end of 2020 (4.4% of 
GDP),	and	replaced	them	with	an	income	support	program	of	a	much	lower	amount	(0.6%	of	GDP).
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However, these stimuli exacerbated the country’s macro-financial 
imbalances, such as high inflation and reliance on external financing. This 
has been reflected in the depreciation of the lira and diminishing reserves, 
leaving the country considerably vulnerable to a tightening of global financial 
conditions. Against this backdrop, the Turkish central bank shifted towards 
a more restrictive monetary policy (see Chart 1.1.4) so as to keep inflation 
and depreciation pressures in check.9 More recently, the dismissal of the 
head of the country’s central bank triggered a further sharp depreciation of 
the lira and capital outflows, resulting in significant financial turmoil.
1.1.2 Spain
As	in	the	rest	of	the	world,	the	developments	in	the	Spanish	economy	since	
the	spring	of	2020	have	been	entirely	conditioned	by	COVID-19. In 2020, Spanish 
GDP registered an annual average contraction of -10.8%, the steepest drop in recent 
history. The impact was concentrated in H1, followed by an incipient recovery from 
Q3 onwards (see Chart 1.2). During this period, private consumption and investment 
were severely weighed down by the drop in income, heightened uncertainty and the 
restrictions to contain the pandemic. Foreign trade flows have also plunged, leading 
the external balance to make a net negative contribution to GDP growth in real terms. 
The decline in tourism exports has been particularly severe, heavily affected by the 
restrictions on international travel.
The	upturn	in	activity	was	robust	in	2020 Q3,	but	ground	to	a	halt	in	Q4	as	a	
result	of	adverse	epidemiological	developments.	In any event, the recovery has 
been only partial thus far. Reduced control over the spread of the virus during the 
winter months negatively affected the confidence of households and firms, with the 
attendant adverse bearing on aggregate demand, and led to more stringent 
restrictions on mobility and economic activity,10 with additional negative effects. 
However, these had a far smaller impact on GDP than in Q2, thanks to economic 
agents adapting to the new environment. Nevertheless, at the turn of the year Spain 
was still among the economies hardest hit by the pandemic, with quarterly GDP in 
2020 Q4 down 8.9% on pre-crisis levels, while that gap for the euro area as a whole 
stood at more than 4% (see Chart 1.2).
In	the	near	term,	economic	activity	growth	is	expected	to	be	modest	until	the	
population has been immunised. Under the baseline scenario of the Banco de 
España’s most recent projections, GDP would grow robustly in 2021 H2 thanks to 
 9	 	In	addition,	the	Turkish	central	bank	and	banking	supervisory	authority	began	to	unwind	the	stimulus	measures	
for lending.
10  See Ghirelli, Gonzalez, Herrera and Hurtado, “Weather, mobility and the evolution of the COvID-19 pandemic”, 
Working Paper No 2109, Banco de España.
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headway in the vaccination process, the use of NGEU funds11 and the international 
economic performance. Spanish GDP would grow by 6% in 2021 under this baseline 
scenario, with the recovery in activity continuing in 2022 and 2023 (see Chart 1.2.2).
However,	owing	to	the	very	high	level	of	uncertainty,	two	alternative	scenarios	
were envisaged. Uncertainty regarding the duration of the health crisis appears to 
have diminished given the anticipated progress in the vaccination process. 
Nonetheless, doubts persist regarding the extent of the pandemic’s potential 
negative economic effects beyond the short term, which is not entirely unconnected 
with the duration of the pandemic itself. Resolute and coordinated action through 
economic policy, providing private agents with income and liquidity, has been a key 
factor in limiting the damage to the productive system. However, it will not succeed 
11  See Box 1 “Macroeconomic	projections	for	the	Spanish	economy	(2021-2023)”, Quarterly report on the Spanish 
economy March 2021.
Spanish GDP declined 10.8% year-on-year in 2020, the sharpest drop in its recent history and larger than that of comparable European 
countries. The impact was concentrated in H1, with an incipient, albeit incomplete, recovery as of Q3. Thus, in the last quarter of 2020, economic 
activity in Spain stood considerably below pre-pandemic levels (-8.9%). Under the baseline scenario of the projections, based on the gradual 
disappearance of the pandemic’s adverse economic effects, Spain would recover the GDP level observed prior to the onset of the crisis in 2023 
H2. As a result of the uncertainty as to precisely how the health situation will unfold and the degree of permanence of the economic impacts felt 
in 2020, additional scenarios have been considered, generating a range of possible GDP trajectories around the baseline projection.
AMONG THE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, THE PANDEMIC HAS HAD A PARTICULARLY SEVERE IMPACT ON SPAIN'S GDP,
WHICH UNDER THE BASELINE SCENARIO WOULD RECOVER PRE-CRISIS LEVELS IN 2023
Chart 1.2
SOURCES: Eurostat and Banco de España.
a GDP year-on-year change in 2020 Q4.
b A baseline scenario and two alternative scenarios (mild and severe) are projected for the Spanish economy. These alternative scenarios differ from 
the baseline scenario in terms of the course of the pandemic and the medium-term consequences thereof. For more infomation, please see March 
2021 Macroeconomic Projections in Spain 2021-2023.
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in preventing such damage altogether, particularly if the health crisis persists for an 
extended period of time. The scenarios also differ in another respect: the degree of 
persistence of the behavioural changes prompted by COVID-19 among economic 
agents. To this end, different assumptions were considered regarding household 
spending decisions in Spain and the rest of the world (through tourism exports).
The	 additional	 risks	 for	 the	 baseline	 scenario	 include	 more	 adverse	
epidemiological	developments	(particularly	in	the	near	term),	uncertainty	over	
the	resilience	of	households,	and	the	scale	of	the	incipient	structural	changes	
that	 the	 pandemic	 may	 have	 accelerated. First, potential epidemiological 
developments that are more adverse than anticipated (for instance, relating to new, 
more contagious and more vaccine-resistant strains of the virus) could jeopardise the 
pace of the recovery in 2021, owing to their direct negative effects on aggregate 
demand as a result of impaired confidence and the need to introduce more stringent 
restrictions on movement. Second, despite the forcefulness of the measures 
introduced (particularly the schemes to preserve employment in the near term and to 
provide liquidity to firms, added to which would be the impact of the NGEU programme 
in 2021), the prolongation of the health crisis increases the likelihood of a downturn in 
the labour market and of rising business insolvencies, causing persistent damage to 
the productive system. A further source of uncertainty is the pandemic accelerating 
certain pre-existing structural transformation processes, such as digitalisation, which 
would require a reallocation of economic resources of an unknown magnitude.
1.2 Financial markets and the real estate sector
1.2.1 Financial markets
Since	the	cut-off	date	of	the	last	FSR,	the	development	of	effective	vaccines	against	
cOViD-19 and progress in the vaccination process on a global scale have driven 
price	gains	for	risk-bearing	assets	on	international	financial	markets,	despite	the	
new	waves	of	the	virus	that	were	exacerbated	by	the	emergence	of	new	strains. 
Following the uptick in risk aversion in late October, triggered by the worsening of the 
pandemic in Europe and uncertainty over the outcome of the presidential elections in the 
United States, the publication of data on vaccine effectiveness in early Novermber and, 
since the beginning of this year, the progress of the vaccination campaign have generated 
optimism among investors. This has been reflected in gains on stock market indices, 
declining credit risk premia and a decrease in asset price volatility, likewise supported by 
the elimination of other risk scenarios, such as the United Kingdom withdrawing from the 
European Union without an agreement12 (see Charts 1.3.1, 1.3.2 and 1.3.3). 
12	 	There	 was	 sporadic	 volatility	 increase	 on	 the	 S&P	 500	 (VIX)	 index	 towards	 the	 end	 of	 January,	 linked	 to	
coordinated transactions by retail investors; since mid-February, volatility increased on US sovereign bond 
options	(MOVE)	owing	to	steepening	at	the	long	end	of	the	yield	curve.
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Long-term	yields	on	higher-rated	sovereign	debt	have	risen	in	the	year	to	date,	
particularly	in	the	United	States. These developments have been shaped by lower 
risk aversion, more favourable economic expectations, an increase in expected 
inflation and fiscal spending packages, which will require new issuances by 
treasuries. Because these act as safe-haven assets, the returns demanded on them 
declined significantly during the height of the uncertainty at the onset of the 
The development of effective vaccines against COVID-19 and progress in their distribution have generated optimism among investors, which 
has been reflected by rising stock market indices, declining credit risk premiums and narrowing sovereign debt spreads in the euro area, 
along with lower volatility for asset prices. Rising equity prices have lifted US stock markets to very high levels relative to the companies’ 
cyclically adjusted earnings.
MEDICAL ADVANCES AGAINST COVID-19 HAVE FAVOURED THE REVALUATION OF RISK-BEARING ASSETS IN RECENT
MONTHS, ALTHOUGH DOUBTS HAVE BEEN RAISED OVER THEIR SUSTAINABILITY IN SOME CASES
Chart 1.3
SOURCES: Robert J. Shiller and Thomson Reuters Datastream.
a High yield: ICE Bank of America Merrill Lynch High Yield index. Investment grade: ICE Bank of America Merrill Lynch Corporate index.
b Average three-month volatility of USD/EUR, USD/GBP and JPY/USD.
c The cyclically adjusted PER is calculated as the ratio between the share price and the 10-year moving average for earnings.
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pandemic. With the exception of Japan, these yields remain below the levels 
observed in early 2020 (see Chart  1.4.1). This lower risk aversion has also been 
conducive to the sustained depreciation of the US dollar, which also acts as a safe-
haven asset, although that trend looks to be reversing this year due to better 
expectations for economic recovery in the United States (see Chart 1.4.2).
In	euro	area	sovereign	bond	markets,	long-term	yield	spreads	between	countries	
have	continued	at	reduced	levels	in	the	first	quarter	of	2021.	This has been driven 
by the ECB purchase programmes, particularly the PEPP (which was extended in 
December following the recalibration of monetary policy instruments), and by the 
agreement on the EU’s recovery fund (see Chart 1.3.2).
In	the	final	stretch	of	2020,	the	strongest	gains	on	stock	market	indices	came	
in	those	sectors	that	had	experienced	the	largest	losses	since	the	onset	of	the	
pandemic. Accordingly, prices in the banking sector have accumulated stronger 
gains since early November than other sectors, such as telecommunications or 
technology. In keeping with these developments, and as a consequence of the 
different sectoral composition of the stock markets, European indices, particularly 
the IBEX 35, have posted more robust gains than the S&P  500.13 However, the 
indices of more cyclical sectors (including the banking index) and some of the 
13	 	In	particular,	the	banking	sector	has	a	weight	of	approximately	5%	on	the	S&P	500,	6%	on	the	EURO	STOXX	50	
and	22%	on	the	IBEX	35,	while	the	weight	of	the	technology	sector	is	28%,	13%	and	6%,	respectively.
The long-term yields of higher-rated sovereign bonds have risen, especially in the United States and the United Kingdom, shaped by lower 
risk aversion, more favourable economic expectations, an increase in expected inflation and the fiscal spending packages. Lower risk 
aversion has also helped the US dollar to continue its depreciation in the final stages of 2020, although that trend seems to have reversed 
since the start of 2021 owing to improved economic recovery expectations in the United States.
LONG-TERM YIELDS HAVE RISEN FOR HIGHER-RATED SOVEREIGN BONDS AND THE US DOLLAR HAS CEASED ITS
DEPRECIATION SINCE THE TURN OF THE YEAR
Chart 1.4
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European overall indices remain below pre-crisis levels. By contrast, the US index 
has reached all-time highs (see Chart 1.3.1).
In	recent	months,	corporate	credit	risk	premia	have	declined	more	sharply	in	
the	high-yield	segment	than	in	the	investment-grade	segment,	all	the	segments	
now standing close to pre-pandemic levels. This performance appears to have 
been underpinned by central banks’ asset purchase programmes and by lower risk 
aversion (see Chart  1.3.2). In the United States, where the central bank includes 
investment-grade and high-yield bonds in its purchase programme, issuances of 
both types of instrument ended 2020 at record highs, while in the euro area and 
Spain this was only true of the investment-grade segment. Since the beginning of 
2021, US and euro area issuances in the high-yield segment already exceed those of 
previous years.
The	 number	 of	 corporate	 bond	 credit	 rating	 downgrades	 has	 declined	
significantly	 in	 recent	 months,	 although	 a	 slight	 rebound	 was	 observed	 in	
March. This reduction has also been observed in the case of Spanish companies. 
Since the onset of the crisis, the cumulative number of downgrades worldwide and 
in the euro area is lower than that observed in the equivalent period following the 
collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008. Nonetheless, a notable proportion 
of issuances with BBB rating continues to have a negative outlook.
The	 rapid	 recovery	 in	 the	prices	of	 risk-bearing	assets	 in	certain	segments	
has	raised	concerns	regarding	their	sustainability,	particularly	if	certain	risks	
materialise. Price corrections could be triggered for some assets – particularly 
those with the most evident signs of high valuations – by a worsening of the 
epidemiological situation, a downward revision of corporate earnings expectations 
or a premature withdrawal of State support measures. In particular, the cyclically 
adjusted price-to-earnings ratio (PER) of S&P 500 firms is currently high, standing 
above its historical average. This is largely due to the price performance of a handful 
of large firms, particularly in the technology sector. By contrast, equity prices in the 
euro area and Spain do not appear high compared to the cyclically adjusted earnings 
of the listed companies (see Chart 1.3.4). The credit risk premia on corporate debt 
markets are low relative to the historical relationship with their fundamentals, 
particularly in the high-yield segment, which may be linked, among other factors, to 
the effect of asset purchase programmes run by central banks (see Box 1.1).
1.2.2 the real estate market in Spain
House	sales	fell	by	17.7%	in	2020,	weighed	down	by	a	sharp	fall-off	during	the	
initial	 months	 of	 the	 pandemic.	 Following the stringent lockdown last spring, 
house sales began a gradual recovery trajectory that extended until the end of the 
year, underpinned by the release of the demand that was pent up during the first 
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wave of COVID-19. This upward trajectory in transactions in 2020 H2 did not continue 
into early 2021; sales declined year-on-year in January and February (see Chart 1.5). 
The less favourable developments in transactions in the first two months of the year 
were concentrated in the second-hand housing and the multi-family housing 
segments. By regions, this reduced buoyancy was largely seen in the regions that 
tend to present higher transaction volumes. Meanwhile, sales of new or single-family 
House sales ended 2020 with a negative balance, weighed down by the slump in transactions during the early months of the pandemic.  
Despite this context, house prices did not record widespread declines, but rather continued the pre-existing slowdown. The new housing 
segment registered a more favourable trend, which may reflect a certain shift in the preferences of agents. New lending for house purchase 
recovered significantly in 2020 H2, partially offsetting the decline recorded during the spring lockdown. Lending standards for new mortgages 
appear to have tightened slightly in recent quarters.
PROPERTY TRANSACTIONS HAVE BEEN IMPACTED BY THE COURSE OF THE PANDEMIC, AS HAS NEW LENDING FOR ITS
PURCHASE, WHILE PRICES HAVE CONTINUED TO DECELERATE
Chart 1.5
SOURCES: INE, Colegio de Registradores and Banco de España.
a Cumulative three-month data.
b Quarterly data. Four-quarter average.
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homes have demonstrated greater resilience since the start of the recovery than 
those of second-hand or multi-family housing. This pattern could continue if the 
apparent shift in buyer preferences – towards larger homes with open spaces and 
located in peripheral areas of cities – takes root, insofar as new or single-family 
housing is able to adapt flexibly to these changes. 
House	prices	continued	the	trend	slowdown	that	began	prior	to	the	pandemic,	
with	 no	 across-the-board	declines	observed	 thus	 far. The house price index 
rose 1.5% year-on-year in 2020 Q4, with a notable acceleration in new-build prices 
(8.2%), which may, at least in part, reflect investment decisions taken before the 
crisis as well as the above-mentioned shift in demand trends (see Chart 1.5.2). By 
contrast, second-hand house prices continued to slow (0.4%). The resilience of 
residential property prices to date stands in contrast to the sharp declines observed 
during the global financial crisis. Several factors are behind this. First, the current 
crisis was not prompted by an oversized real estate sector or the financial excesses 
thereof. Further, forced property sales have so far been kept in check thanks to the 
introduction of income protection mechanisms – such as mortgage moratoria and 
furlough schemes – for those households most affected by the crisis, together with 
the far more stringent credit standards for house purchase in recent years and lower 
levels of indebtedness. Lastly, prior to the onset of the pandemic there were no clear 
widespread signs of property market overvaluation. The future evolution of house 
prices is also affected by the uncertainty about the intensity of the recovery in 
economic activity.
In	 the	 real	 estate	 credit	 market,	 new	 loans	 for	 house	 purchase	 have	 also	
recovered	somewhat,	while	credit	standards	appear	to	have	tightened	slightly.	
2020 H2 saw a significant recovery in the volume of mortgage loans for house purchase, 
which helped to partially offset the heavy fall-off in such lending in the months following 
the outbreak of the pandemic (see Chart 1.5.3). However, this performance has been 
accompanied by a slight tightening of credit standards. Accordingly, the proportion of 
new loans with a loan-to-price ratio (LTP) of over 80% has declined (see Chart 1.5.4). 
Among these, the share of mortgages with long repayment periods has decreased. 
Moreover, the interest rate spread against the risk-free reference rate held practically 
unchanged in 2020. These developments suggest that institutions remain somewhat 




online	 sales	 accounting	 for	 a	 larger	 share. The number of transactions has 
plunged and prices have declined across the board, albeit moderately. Against this 
backdrop, new mortgages secured by commercial real estate show no sign of 
recovery and credit standards have tightened. This is reflected in, for instance, the 
decline in the share of mortgages with a high LTP ratio.
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1.3 the non-financial sectors 
1.3.1 non-financial corporations and households
the cOViD-19 crisis is having a severe impact on corporate earnings. On the 
information available for the sample of firms contributing to the Central Balance 
Sheet Data Office Quarterly Survey (CBQ), which are predominantly large firms, the 
percentage of companies with a negative ROA14 increased to 34% in 2020, up 8 pp 
compared to 201915 (see Chart 1.6.1). According to the microsimulations conducted,16 
the drop in profitability was particularly steep for SMEs and, in particular, in the 
hospitality and entertainment, motor vehicles, wholesale and retail trade and 
transportation and storage sectors.
The	 degree	 of	 financial	 pressure	 borne	 by	 firms	 as	 a	 result	 of	 their	
indebtedness also seems to be increasing. The aggregate debt-to-GDP ratio 
increased by 12 pp over 2020 (see Chart 1.6.2). Slightly two-thirds of this increase 
would be due to the decline in output. These developments also appear to have 
resulted in an increase, albeit far more muted, in the interest burden ratio, thanks 
to low financing costs. On CBQ data, the performance of firm-level debt in 2020 
indicates that the heightened financial pressure borne by this sector owes more 
to their lower earnings than their increased net debt.17 Box 1.2 examines the 
uneven developments in bank debt across firms that presented different financial 
characteristics prior to the outbreak of the crisis. Box 1.3 explores measures 
geared towards boosting firms’ solvency, in reaction to these recent 
developments.
The	 degree	 of	 final	 pressure	 on	 households	 also	 appears	 to	 be	 rising,	
particularly	among	 those	households	most	affected	by	 the	crisis.	However,	
the	public	support	measures	seem	to	have	helped	 to	considerably	mitigate	
these	effects	thus	far.	According to the Spanish Survey of Household Finances,18 
the percentage of more vulnerable households was higher in the sectors hardest hit 
by the pandemic.19 In any event, social transfers in the form of unemployment 
14	 	Return	on	assets	=	(ordinary	net	profit	+	financial	costs)	/	assets	net	of	non-interest-bearing	liabilities.
15  See “The	impact	of	the	COVID-19	crisis	on	the	financial	position	of	non-financial	corporations	in	2020:	CBSO-
based evidence”, Analytical Article, Economic Bulletin	4/2020,	Banco	de	España.
16	 	Microsimulations	were	conducted	based	on	corporate	information	sourced	from	the	integrated	CBSO	database	
for	2018	and	2019	to	estimate	the	behaviour	of	firms	in	2020.
17	 	See	Box	 “Recent	developments	 in	 the	 indebtedness	of	 the	non-financial	 corporate	 sector”	 in	 the	Analytical	
Article “Results	of	non-financial	corporations	to	2020	Q4.	Preliminary	year-end	data”, Economic Bulletin,	1/2021,	
Banco de España.
18	 	The	 latest	 available	 Spanish	 Survey	 of	 Household	 Finances	 relates	 to	 2017.	 However,	 the	 household-level	
information	 that	 the	survey	provides	on	wealth	distribution	among	Spanish	households	 tends	 to	be	 relatively	
stable over time. 
19  See “The	financial	position	of	the	workers	most	affected	by	the	pandemic:	an	analysis	drawing	on	the	Spanish	
Survey of Household Finances”, Analytical Article, Economic Bulletin	3/2020,	Banco	de	España.
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benefits, furlough schemes20 and the minimum living income21 have helped cushion 
the drop in income for these households. Likewise, the moratoria on the debt burden 
of households most affected by the crisis, along with those on rent payments and 
energy consumption, seem to have eased the pressure on these lower income 
households, albeit temporarily. Both the aggregate debt ratio and the debt burden in 
terms of gross disposable income (GDI) increased slightly in 2020. This owed to the 
decline in GDI (which was concentrated among certain groups) being largely offset 





21  In March 2020, the minimum living income had been granted to more than 203,000 households comprising 
565,000 individuals.
The COVID-19 crisis has entailed a sharp deterioration in corporate earnings. On the information available for the sample of firms reporting 
to the Central Balance Sheet Data Office Quarterly Survey, the percentage of them with a negative ordinary return on assets increased to 34% 
in 2020, up 8 pp on the previous year. Firms’ liquidity needs have been largely covered by recourse to credit, supported by the measures 
deployed by authorities, which, together with a sharp contraction of GDP, has resulted in an increase in the debt ratio and, to a lesser extent, 
debt burden for the first time in a decade.
THE COVID-19 CRISIS HAS ADVERSELY AFFECTED THE PROFITABILITY OF FIRMS, WHICH HAVE INCREASED THEIR
INDEBTEDNESS AFTER A DECADE OF DELEVERAGING
Chart 1.6
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a The data are from the Central Balance Sheet Data Office Quarterly Survey (CBQ). Return on assets = (Ordinary net profit + Financial costs) / Assets 
net of non-interest-bearing borrowing.
b R: ordinary return on net assets.
c The debt burden of firms only includes interest payments, given the difficulty of reliably estimating the amount of repayment instalments.
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degree	 of	 heterogeneity	 in	 income	 and	wealth	 levels	within	 the	 sector. The 
household saving rate reached record highs, with most of the funds channelled 
towards deposits. However, in all probability, the growth in the most liquid wealth was 
concentrated among the least vulnerable households. The negative impact on 
households’ employment income has varied markedly depending on the sector of 
employment (see Chart 1.7.2). Box 1.2 also examines the heterogeneous response to 
the COVID-19 crisis of bank debt among individuals with different characteristics in 
terms of income, employment status and other attributes that provide insight into the 
fragility of their income. 
1.3.2 General government in Spain
The	year	2020	ended	with	a	pronounced	deterioration	of	public	finances	in	
Spain	owing	to	the	effects	of	the	pandemic	and	the	associated	containment	
measures. At end-2020, the general government deficit stood at 11% of GDP, 
notably up on the 2.9% recorded in 2019, and public debt reached 120 % of GDP 
(see Chart 1.8.1). The reclassification of SAREB as part of the public 
Despite the pandemic, Spanish households have continued reducing their debt in aggregate terms. However, the decline in income, which 
has been concentrated among workers with the closest ties to those industries hardest hit by restrictions on social interaction, has driven up 
the debt-to-GDI ratio.
ALTHOUGH HOUSEHOLDS CONTINUE REDUCING THEIR DEBT, THE FALL IN INCOME HAS DRIVEN UP THE AGGREGATE 
DEBT RATIO OF THIS SECTOR
Chart 1.7
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a The debt burden of households comprises interest payments and debt repayments.
b Social Security registrations are seasonally adjusted.
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sector22 contributes 0.9 pp to the rise in deficit and 3 pp to the increase in public 
debt. The rest is explained by both a decline in revenue (-5%) and, above all, an 
increase in spending (10%). The former was marked by the impact of the fall-off 
in activity on tax bases and by the tax moratoria introduced to help firms 
experiencing liquidity problems; in the case of personal income tax, these were 
partly offset by the general government measures to support the income of 
private agents. In turn, spending increased as a result of the measures adopted 




situation, marked by a continuous series of losses in later years. In accounting terms, this operation is registered 
as a transfer of capital from the public sector to the rest of resident agents in 2020, for the negative net accounting 
value of SAREB, and a rise in public debt, for an amount equal to the liabilities of SAREB.
23  See Macroeconomic scenarios for the Spanish economy (2021-2023).
The resolute action taken by fiscal authorities in 2020 has been effective in counteracting the adverse economic effects of COVID-19. 
However, the resulting deterioration of public finances means greater vulnerability to potential additional shocks. In the short term, favourable 
financing conditions and European fund programmes should allow the expansionary fiscal policy stance to continue. The main risk for public 
finances continues to be a setback in resolving the health crisis that gives rise to more pronounced and persistent effects on economic 
activity. In the medium term, once the effects of the crisis are overcome, a credible and sustained consolidation process is required.
THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC HAS NOTABLY IMPAIRED THE GENERAL GOVERNMENT FINANCIAL POSITION IN SPAIN
Chart 1.8
SOURCES: IGAE and Banco de España.
a Four-quarter cumulative data.
b The budget deficit and government debt estimates for 2020 and 2021-2023 do not include the assumption of Sareb debt by the general government, 
a fact known after the preparation of the forecasts.
c Macroeconomic scenarios of the Banco de España projections published on March 23, 2021. The squares of 2020 correspond to the data published 
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the	general	government	balance	in	2021-2023. The persistence of COVID-19 has 
led to the extension until 30 May 2021 of the extraordinary measures relating to 
furlough schemes and temporary discontinuation of activity schemes for the self-
employed. The expiries of loan guarantee facilities have also been extended and 
new direct support measures for firms have been introduced. Later, a new package 
of measures has been approved to support firm solvency, including direct aid, for a 
total amount of €11 billion. However, a series of factors will help partially correct the 
deficit this year. First, a significant recovery in government receipts is expected 
thanks to the projected improvement in economic activity, especially in 2021 H2, 
and, to a lesser extent, increased tax revenue stemming from the new income 
measures budgeted for 2021. Second, the progressive disappearance of the bulk of 
the measures approved in 2020 should result in far more moderate spending growth. 
Overall,	in	2021	the	general	government	balance	could	stand	between	-6.8%	
and	 -9.1%	 of	 GDP,	 depending	 on	 whether	 the	 macroeconomic	 scenario	 is	
closer	to	the	baseline	scenario	or	the	severe	scenario	envisaged	by	the	Banco	
de España in March (see Chart 1.8.2). The correction of the imbalance in public 
finances looks set to continue in 2022 and 2023 thanks to the expected cyclical 
improvement. Nonetheless, under any of the scenarios the deficit would remain 
above 3% of GDP in 2023. Government debt will hold at very high levels under any 
of the envisaged scenarios.
The	 European	 authorities’	 response	 to	 the	 crisis	will	 constitute	 one	 of	 the	
main	catalysts	for	activity	in	the	short	and	medium	term. The monetary measures 
adopted by the ECB have helped ward off tensions in the sovereign debt markets, 
making for highly favourable financing conditions. In the fiscal realm, the launch of 
the NGEU, which could finance investment projects for up to €140 billion in Spain in 
the next six years, will allow the country’s fiscal policy to maintain an expansionary 
stance.
Thereafter,	rebuilding	Spanish	public	finances	will	require	considerable	effort.	
Authorities should devise, without further delay, a credible and sufficient fiscal 
consolidation programme over a long period, with implementation commencing once 
the health and economic crisis ends. This is needed to curb the spread of vulnerabilities 
from general government to other economic sectors and to foster long-term growth.
1.3.3  Financial flows vis-à-vis the rest of the world and the international 
investment position
In	 the	 second	 half	 of	 2020,	 acquisitions	 of	 foreign	 assets	 by	 residents	
moderated	very	significantly	 relative	 to	 the	 first	half	of	 the	year,	while	non-
residents	disinvested	in	the	Spanish	economy.	This resulted in a reduction in the 
financial account surplus of the Spanish economy's balance of payments in half 
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(€33.6 billion, down from €62.5 billion in the first half of 2020), excluding Banco de 
España (see Figure 1.9.1). On the asset side, this different behaviour in the first and 
second half of the year is mainly explained by the disinvestments in the heading of 
another investment worth €47.1 billion (compared to investments of €62.3 billion in 
the first half of the year), in particular in short-term deposits of monetary financial 
institutions. On the liability side, the disinvestments of long-term government debt 
(€23.6 billion) and of short-term deposits from monetary financial institutions (€25.7 
billion) stand out. The financial account of Banco de España again presented a 
debtor position, although smaller in the second half of 2020 than in the first, linked 
to purchases of Eurosystem assets (the APP and PEPP programmes). This translated 
into a bulging increase in the TARGET debtor balance throughout 2020, worth €108 
billion.
The	Spanish	economy’s	negative	net	 international	 investment	position	 (IIP)	
increased	 slightly	 in	 2020	 (€	 19.6	 billion),	 while	 gross	 external	 debt	 has	
In 2020 H2, the current account surplus in the Spanish economy, excluding the Banco de España, moderated with respect to H1. This owed 
to purchases of foreign assets by resident sectors standing well below those of H1. The negative net international investment position (IIP) 
grew in GDP terms owing primarily to the decline in output. For its part, Spain’s gross external debt in terms of GDP rose in 2020 to record 
highs due to the decline in output, but also as a result of the rise in external liabilities flows, specifically of the Banco de España and general 
government, and valuation effects.
IN RECENT QUARTERS, THE SPANISH ECONOMY’S NEGATIVE NET INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT POSITION AND GROSS
EXTERNAL DEBT IN TERMS OF GDP HAVE RISEN, WITH THE LATTER REACHING RECORD HIGHS
Chart 1.9
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a Net change in assets less net change in liabilities.
b A positive (negative) value in the series denotes a credit (debit) position.
c The negative net IIP is the difference between the value of the external liabilities of the resident sectors and that of the assets to the rest of the world.
d External debt comprises the balance of all liabilities that entail future repayment of principal, interest or both (i.e. all financial instruments, except 
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increased	considerably.	 In 2020, the negative net IIP rose by 10 pp of GDP to 
84.4%, as a result not only of the increase in the numerator, but especially because 
of the decrease in the denominator (see Chart 1.9.2). The country’s gross external 
debt grew in the same period by €115.2 billion, triggered by the rise in the Banco de 
España’s external liabilities flows and, to a lesser extent, those of general 
government, and by the increase in the market value of these instruments. Gross 
external debt stood at 199.7% of GDP, an all-time high and up 29.3 pp on the figure 
at end-2019. The current favourable financial conditions make it easier to finance 
Spain’s external debt, although the high level of such debt represents an element of 
vulnerability to a potential tightening of conditions on international financial markets. 
While the composition of the debt, with the public sector accounting for a large 
share and lengthy average repayment periods, helps mitigate these risks to some 
extent, its high level could magnify the impact of the financial stability risks 
considered in this FSR.
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